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      Amended pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) 
________ 
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, HARDIMAN, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 1, 2011) 
______ 
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OPINION 
______ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
Defendants Ronald Castille and John McMahon appeal from the District Court‟s 
denial of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended civil rights complaint filed 
by Harold Wilson.  Appellants argue that they are entitled to absolute or qualified 
immunity for the acts alleged.
1
  The District Court held that certain of the allegations 
survive dismissal as a matter of law.  We find that holding to be questionable, and will 
remand with instructions to grant Wilson leave to amend his amended complaint to 
comport with the pleading requirements.
2
 
Wilson was convicted of triple homicide in 1989 and sentenced to death. 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 672 A.2d 293, 296 (Pa. 1996).  He was thereafter granted a 
new trial and ultimately acquitted after spending approximately fifteen years in prison.  
Wilson filed a complaint in the District Court asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against, inter alia, Appellants Castille (former Philadelphia District Attorney) and 
                                              
1
  The parties consented to assignment of the case to Magistrate Judge Restrepo for 
all proceedings.  Under the circumstances, we will refer to the opinion as that of the 
District Court. 
 
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This court has 
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937, 1945-47 (2009).  Our review is plenary.  See Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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McMahon (former Assistant District Attorney) in their individual and official capacities.   
Appellants moved to dismiss, asserting absolute and qualified immunity.   
The District Court denied the motion in part, concluding that Wilson, although 
“barely,” pled sufficient facts to draw a “„reasonable inference that the defendant[s] 
[Castille and McMahon] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged.‟”  Wilson v. City of 
Phila., No. 04-5396, 2010 WL 1254111, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (quoting Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).  After dismissing the majority of the complaint,
3
 
the Court noted that Wilson‟s complaint “in this case alleges, among other things, factual 
allegations of „misconduct during the investigation‟ and „arrests,‟ including 
„manipulat[ion] and coach[ing] witnesses, and then withh[olding] from [Wilson] that they 
had done so‟ in an „effort to arrest and imprison [Wilson] for the crimes he did not 
commit.‟”  Id. at *5 (alterations in original). 
Appellants contend that the District Court erred in concluding that these 
allegations comport with the pleading requirements.  A pleading must contain a “short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  This reflects a liberal notice pleading requirement, in that “[s]pecific 
facts are not necessary; the statement need only „give the defendant fair notice of what 
                                              
3
  The Court granted the motion to dismiss as to Appellants with respect to (1) 
Wilson‟s claims against Appellants in their individual capacities relating to the jury 
selection process in Wilson‟s 1989 prosecution and their conduct in connection with 
Wilson‟s state post-conviction proceedings; (2) Wilson‟s § 1983 claims against 
McMahon in his official capacity as Assistant District Attorney; and (3) Wilson‟s state 
law claims against Appellants in their official capacities.  Wilson, 2010 WL 1254111, at 
*2, *8. 
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the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‟”  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotations 
omitted)).   
The Supreme Court has instructed that a court should engage in a two step analysis 
when considering whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss:  the court must first 
determine whether a claim is supported by well-pleaded factual allegations and, if so, the 
court must determine whether those well-pleaded factual allegations, which are entitled to 
an assumption of truth, plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1950.  As the Supreme Court stated in Iqbal, a court need not accept as true “legal 
conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements . . . .”  Id. at 1949. 
The District Court in this case, looking to the issue of entitlement to relief, 
accurately reviewed the legal principles with respect to prosecutor‟s immunity in stating 
that “absolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as „an officer of 
the court,‟ but is instead engaged in other tasks, say, investigative or administrative 
tasks.”  Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2000) (quotation omitted).  After 
applying those principles to dismiss many of the allegations as to the appealing 
defendants, the District Court stated that:  “plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint also alleges 
that „[i]n an effort to arrest and imprison Plaintiff for the crimes he did not commit, 
Defendants, acting personally, as well [sic] by and through conspiracy with others, 
manipulated and coached witnesses, and then withheld from Plaintiff that they had done 
5 
 
so‟” (quoting from complaint).  Wilson, 2010 WL 1254111, at *2 (emphasis omitted).  
The District Court concluded that to the extent that Wilson‟s amended complaint alleges 
conduct relating to manipulation and coaching of witnesses in an investigative capacity, 
defendants were not entitled to either absolute or qualified prosecutorial immunity.  The 
District Court recognized the paucity of factual allegations but permitted the complaint to 
stand, liberally viewing the allegations.  We believe the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence 
requires us to apply a more exacting scrutiny of the complaint. 
 An examination of the Supreme Court‟s treatment of allegations in Iqbal is 
instructive.  There, Iqbal alleged that John Ashcroft, the former United States Attorney 
General, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the FBI, “knew of, condoned, and willfully 
and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter 
of policy, solely on account of [Iqbal‟s] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest,” that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of this policy, 
and that Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and executing it.  129 S. Ct. at 1951 
(quotations omitted).  The Supreme Court concluded that these allegations were 
conclusory.  Id.  The Supreme Court also held that Iqbal‟s factual allegations that were 
well-pleaded failed to plausibly allege that his arrest was the result of an invidious policy 
of unconstitutional discrimination.  Id. at 1951-52. 
We agree with Appellants that Wilson‟s complaint, like Iqbal‟s, falls short of what 
is required to survive a motion to dismiss.  Wilson‟s allegations against Appellants are 
conclusory, are not entitled to an assumption of truth, and are insufficient to support his 
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claims.
4
  Nonetheless, this court has held that when a civil rights complaint will be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to 
amend the complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.  See Fletcher-
Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2007).   
Although that assessment is for the District Court in the first instance, Wilson has 
not specified on appeal what supplemental factual averments he would make by way of 
amendment.  It may be that the District Court will grant defendants‟ motion to dismiss, 
but granting him leave to amend certainly would not be inequitable here.  As Wilson 
explains, he filed his amended complaint just two months after Iqbal was decided, “well 
before this Circuit had an opportunity to flesh out the pleading requirements in light of 
that case.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 14.    
Accordingly, we will vacate that part of the District Court‟s judgment denying 
Appellants‟ motion to dismiss and remand with instructions to grant Wilson leave to 
amend his amended complaint if he can do so to comport with the pleading requirements. 
                                              
4
  We note, however, that it is not implausible that Castille and McMahon, who 
were employed during the relevant period by the Office of the District Attorney for the 
City of Philadelphia, personally participated in Wilson‟s criminal matter in an 
investigative capacity.   
